ceeding cost and schedule reduction goals.

According to Stokely and Little, success on the JASSM program was largely attributed to the following three processes:

- Picking contractors *based* on past performance, not processes employed to *get* to that performance.
- Consigning government's role strictly to defining operational requirements, selecting the contractor, and working interfaces that are outside of the contractor's control. No other oversight functions were established.
- Requiring no delineated processes in the contract, resulting in a contract that was, in essence, a performance specification. In other words, "Government doesn't care how the contractor does what they do, as long as they meet the performance requirements … and we [the government] get a 10-year, bumper-to-bumper warranty."

Using What I Learned

Having completed APMC, I arrived at Hanscom AFB to work in the Command and Control (C2) Enterprise Integration PMO. Prior to taking the position, I was informed that Hanscom AFB is currently assessed as "critically" undermanned, with only 50 percent manpower assigned—and absolutely no relief in sight. As I approach my new job and begin to plan/organize, I will seek to optimize those areas in which the government has true competency and value-added.

Government's New Role As Enablers, Catalysts

Even though the government, for the most part, is divesting some risk to contractors via TSPR, there remain many areas, if not all, that the PMO can divest in the form of cross-checking and oversight control. We may keep the traditional functional titles, such as Engineering, Logistics, Test and Evaluation, etc., but the new roles for personnel assigned to a government PMO will change to function more as enablers, or catalysts.

We will determine what broader experience (from other PMOs) the government functional person may have that a contractor would not have, and then let that person share their insight as a daily contributor to the contractor's Integrated Product Teams (IPTs).

The government will assume no control over the functional, allocated, or product baselines—only performance specifications. The contractor, unless proven otherwise, will assume the role of self-oversight and will conduct his or her own verification testing and quality assurance/inspections.

The government/contractor lines will be blurred even further as we make smart business decisions together so that the contractor stays healthy and makes an unregulated profit, and the government receives world-class products and services for a reasonable price and schedule. Unregulated profit will further motivate the existing defense industry players as well as invite other world-class producers who previously shunned DoD's Byzantine system, mainly due to the low, single-digit returns.

We will share our budget/program element/PPBS information so contractors understand the convoluted PPBS process and its twisted rewards for near-sighted planning and execution (obligations/expenditures and OSD's "ramp" management).

I will try to focus our resources not only on those areas over which the contractor has no control (as mentioned with the PPBS), but also in the area of integration—specifically with other platforms the contractor may have inherited, and now must control without benefit of a contractual relationship(s) with the original developers/vendors.

I envision real collaboration in the development of Interface Control Documents (ICDs), where the government input likely will have the most value-added.

Another area to be addressed (primarily targeted at the operational warfighters, but also the contractors) is the topic of spiral development. We will work continuously with the operators to drive home the point that initial performance

New Air Force Assistant Secretary for Acquisition Sworn In

WASHINGTON (AFPN), Jan.4, 2002—Dr. Marvin R. Sambur was sworn in Jan. 4, as the new Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, making him responsible for all Air Force research, development, and acquisition activities. In his new position he provides direction, guidance, and supervision on all matters in the formulation, review, approval, and execution of acquisition plans, policies, and programs for the Air Force.

Before his appointment, Sambur was the President and Chief Executive Officer of ITT Defense in McLean, Va., and has more than 33 years of experience in high-technology program acquisition, management, and engineering, focusing on advanced wireless communications systems, sophisticated satellite payloads, air traffic control systems, and electronic warfare.

Sambur has a B.A. in electrical engineering from City College of New York as well as an M.A. and Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a recipient of the IEEE [Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers] Centennial Award for excellence in engineering management.

Editor's Note: This information is in the public domain at *http://www.af.mil/news.*